The Collector should assess the advantages and disadvantages of establishing relationships with the relevant State and non-State entities in light of the Collector’s mission objectives, security strategy, country context, and applicable law. Any such assessment should take place in advance of launching the collection effort (see BP 6).
Cooperating with State authorities (inclusive of de facto State authorities), or non-State entities, such as Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs), as well as private/commercial entities, may be necessary or beneficial to achieving the objectives of the collection effort. For instance, when a collection effort is taking place on the ground in a conflict area, cooperating with the relevant State/NSAG may assist the Collector in acquiring permission or permits to safely enter and move around the territory; to bring in, install, and operate equipment in the territory; and to leave the territory with the equipment and data once the collection effort is complete. Similarly, entering into contracts with private/commercial entities can allow the Collector to secure property leases or other arrangements that may be necessary to the collection effort.
Collectors should also consider that State/NSAG authorities may be hostile to the collection effort, or may themselves perpetrate or contribute to commission of violations in respect of which the data is sought by the Collector. Under such circumstances, cooperation with the host State or with certain State authorities/with the NSAG may not be feasible. The Collector should obtain comprehensive legal advice about the legal landscape within which they seek to operate and the risks involved.
If cooperation is established, the Collector should then assess the feasibility and desirability of formalising the cooperation in writing.
Risks associated with establishing cooperation with States / non-State entities
Establishing links with the authorities of a State or an NSAG involved in an armed conflict may have certain detrimental implications for the Collector. These implications will depend on the mode of cooperation that is established between the Collector and the State/NSAG. For instance, if a Collector cooperates with a State/NSAG in a close manner, the Collector may be regarded as an agent of the State/NSAG. As a consequence, the Collector may become targetable by the State/NSAG’s adversary during the armed conflict, potentially posing a threat to Collector personnel, the collected data, or other affiliated individuals or entities.
The Collector should also consider that links with a State or an NSAG may give rise to actual or perceived biases in the collection effort, which may undermine the neutrality and credibility of the data collected.
If the Collector shares tactical information or intelligence with a State/NSAG and the information or intelligence is used for commission of crimes by the State/NSAG, the Collector may be implicated in such crimes. Notably, if the Collector shares tactical information or intelligence during an armed conflict to assist the State/NSAG in achieving its military objectives, the Collector may be seen as directly participating in the armed conflict, meaning that the Collector’s personnel and property, as civilians and civilian objects, would temporarily lose their protection from targeting under international humanitarian law.
The Collector should similarly consider and document any potential risks that may be associated with establishing cooperation with private/commercial entities that are operating within the context of an armed conflict.
The Collector should additionally consider whether its relationship with a State, NSAG, or other entities involved in or party to an armed conflict has the potential to pose any risk of physical, cyber, or legal harm for third parties to the collection effort. For example, the Collector’s partners/donors/affiliates, which may comprise private entities, other States, or international or regional institutions, may wish to avoid being seen to assist one or another party to the respective conflict.
Accordingly, the Collector should carry out the necessary due diligence before establishing any cooperation with a State, NSAG, or private/commercial entity and, if necessary, create safeguards to protect against the above risks.
Tech Specs & Resources
Refer to BP 6 Technical Specifications + Resources, ‘Risk management resources’.
For information on how to carry out necessary due diligence prior to establishing cooperation with a private/commercial entity, see e.g., OHCHR, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011), and the steps outlined in OHCHR, UN Guide on Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence for Business in Conflict-Affected Contexts (2022), Annex A ‘Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence - Q&A for Businesses’ and Annex B ‘Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence - action overview’.
Legal Framework
See section 4.1. on the duties applicable to private entities and for actors operating in conflict contexts.
See section 3.3. for an overview of the field of international humanitarian law, and section 4.2.1.B. for discussion of how participation in hostilities affects civilian status.
Applicable Ethical Principles Do No Harm; Legal Awareness.